The Friends Committee on National Legislation (a Quaker organization) recently sent out the following as part of an urgent call to action: "If, in the next few weeks, we can persuade at least 100 representatives to cosponsor the McGovern-Jones Exit Strategy bill, they may be able to attach that war-ending provision to the supplemental war funding bill, which Congress will vote on in the next several months.
We oppose the war spending supplemental. We urge representatives to vote against the $33 billion for war. Whether a representative is able to do that or not, however, he or she should be able to cosponsor and vote for the bipartisan McGovern-Jones Exit Strategy bill. We need you to ask your representative to do that now."
(See the Action Alert on the FCNL web site here: http://www.fcnl.org/action/alert.htm
(Please also see my comments about this legislation in my main post, below, directly below the second video in the post.)
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Monday, April 19, 2010
Support S. 3197 and H.R. 5015
When President Obama presented, on December 1, his Afghanistan strategy to Americans, it had the following three objectives:
• Deny al Qaeda a safe haven;
• Reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow Afghanistan's government; and,
• Strengthen Afghanistan's security forces and government. [1]
These objectives would be achieved by sending an additional 30,000 American soldiers to Afghanistan. The response to this EXCALATION of the war was considerable “blowback” – most originating from within his own party and from his political base of support (those folks who voted him into office).
Then, in January, (coincidentally?) revelations began to emerge in the form of statements by U.S. military and Pentagon leaders and others which seemed to indicate a softening of this approach. General McChrystal (U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan) stated in an interview, “There’s been enough fighting. What I think we do is try to shape conditions which allow people to come to a truly equitable solution to how the Afghan people are governed.” And, when asked about Taliban leaders participating in a future government, he responded, “I think any Afghans can play a role if they focus on the future, and not the past.” [2]
Around that same time, Kai Eide, the outgoing U.N. special representative in Afghanistan, urged Afghan President Karzai to take steps that would open the way for face-to-face talks between Afghan officials and Taliban leaders, saying, “If you want relevant results, then you have to talk to the relevant person in authority. I think the time has come to do it.” [2]
Defense secretary Gates also seemed to be supporting a power-sharing arrangement when he described the Taliban as part of Afghanistan’s “political fabric.” And, most devastating of all, was what Gates heard from Pakistani leaders in his recent visit: they would not resume the military offensive against the Taliban in the border region with Afghanistan for at least six months, which for them means more than a year. Gates and the generals know better than anyone else that the U.S. and NATO’s chances of making real and sustainable military progress in Afghanistan depend very heavily on the Taliban’s ability to keep its safe havens across the border in Pakistan. [2]
On March 27, the White House presented a white paper describing in further detail its strategy for Afghanistan (accompanied by a speech – on video – by Obama in which he provides his points in defense of this strategy). This white paper contains the following and other objectives to be achieved with this plan:
• Executing and resourcing an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan;
• Resourcing and prioritizing civilian assistance in Afghanistan;
• Expanding the Afghan National Security Forces: Army and Police;
• Engaging the Afghan government and bolstering its legitimacy;
• Encouraging Afghan government efforts to integrate reconcilable insurgents;
• Bolstering Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation;
• Strengthening Pakistani government capacity;
• Engaging and focusing Islamabad [Pakistan] on the common threat;
• Assisting Pakistan's capability to fight extremists;
• Asking for assistance from allies for Afghanistan and Pakistan;
• (and five more objectives not listed here -- none of which, like the above, are small tasks). [3]
Please consider for a moment all the above, including the building of the Afghan security forces up to the planned total strength of 216,000 by the end of 2011, and the likelihood this can all be achieved by the target date of July, 2011, which will (according to the plan) create the conditions in which we will be able to begin withdrawing troops and – at the same time -- consider that we have already been there for eight years and we have not yet even been able to achieve just the MILITARY objective! Please also consider that Army Gen. David McKiernan acknowledged last year that the handover of security to indigenous forces was "years away." [4]
Now, please consider something that Leslie Gelb said back in December when Obama first announced the troop surge (Gelb is supporting Obama’s “middle course” strategy, which he describes as not agreeing to give General McChrystal all 45,000 troops he requested, nor deciding to begin immediate withdrawal of troops): “So, the job of political leaders and policy experts now is to figure out how to help the president make his middle course more workable and reduce the risks of failure.”
And then he said something very interesting: “By urging this, I’m reversing a promise I made years ago after the Vietnam War. I worked in the Senate and the Pentagon for the early years of the war. I supported the war. When it was done, when I looked back at it and wrote a book about it, I concluded that Presidents Kennedy and Johnson steered a middle way because they felt they couldn’t win and couldn’t get out. Thus, they went step by step, deeper and deeper, doing just enough not to lose, pursuing a horribly costly war without any real prospect of a good outcome, simply hoping for something to turn up. I vowed I wouldn’t be a party to that kind of thinking again. I promised myself that when faced with a situation drowning in contradictions and highly contestable American interests, I would argue either to win or to withdraw.” [5]
I thank Mr. Gelb for bringing a consideration of the lessons (we should have learned) from the Vietnam War into the discussion of Afghanistan.
I now ask you to also consider the opinions of several other experts who do not agree AT ALL with Obama’s strategy to escalate the war by committing even more soldiers (as well as $33 billion tax dollars annually) …
Please watch this video (6 min.) of House debate on the issue and consider the opinions of Rep. Dennis Kucinich and many others (from my good friends at JUST Foreign Policy [emphasis added] ) …
I urge you to also consider what Tyler Moselle (Harvard Kennedy School, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy) said a year ago about U.S. policy regarding Afghanistan: “General David Petraeus of CENTCOM, a handful of American foreign policy thinkers and politicians, and many NATO allies support a “surge” of military troops to stabilize Afghanistan and fight the neo-Taliban insurgency. They rightly argue that the U.S. and the West in general should help rebuild Afghanistan. They argue that increasing the number of troops similar to the surge in Iraq is the first step for providing relief. Yet, while a surge of military troops can provide short-term security, there are six fallacies commonly utilized to support the argument for a surge that should be evaluated more closely to ensure Afghanistan receives the attention it deserves.”
He lists those fallacies and his responses to them, as follows:
Assertion 1: “A Surge in Afghanistan Will Stabilize the Country.” Only partially. A large-scale surge of American troops will likely bolster the legitimacy of the insurgency based on their image as anti-occupation fighters. In fact, increasing troops may attract jihadis from the region just as the Soviet invasion did in the 1980s and provide incentives for foreign powers to funnel funding and weapons to the insurgents as a way to undermine the U.S. (just as Iran did in Iraq and just as the U.S. did during the Soviet invasion).
Assertion 2: “An Army and Marine Corps Style-Surge is the Only Solution for Afghanistan.” Wrong. While U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency doctrine has come a long way, any new military strategy in Afghanistan should be based on Special Forces, intelligence operatives, and potentially constabulary forces from NATO allies. The American footprint should be lighter, not heavier, in Afghanistan. Strategists and policy planners should evaluate the British role in Oman as a useful case study.
Assertion 3: “A Surge is Necessary to Provide Security for a Political Solution.” Poor assumption. The multitude of tribes, ethnic groups, and religious leaders in Afghanistan must be enticed or coaxed into a factionalized political federation to provide stability for the country. Insecurity due to Taliban attacks must be combated by the citizens of Afghanistan based on alliances between tribes. Moreover, Americans are delusional when it comes to nation building. It would take roughly 10 years of a heavy occupation force combined with economic and social development to even start to provide a foundation for transforming deeply rooted issues in Afghanistan. American domestic political sensibilities will not support such an intense and long-term effort nor will the deepening economic recession. American forces do not want to occupy Afghanistan like they did in Germany, Japan, and South Korea — the only largely successful nation building endeavors in modern U.S. history. American policy-makers must articulate more realistic expectations.
Assertion 4: “The Karzai Government Will Fall Apart Without a Surge.” False. Karzai already complained of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. airpower as a propaganda victory for insurgents. U.S. support for Karzai must remain behind the scenes so he can cultivate political will for a unified government. Karzai needs more support but less visible American presence.
Assertion 5: “The Taliban and Potentially Al Qaeda Will Re-Establish Themselves Without a Surge.” Partially true. But Afghan citizens must provide a response to the worldview of both the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is largely discredited as a political movement in many parts of Iraq because of its inability to provide a more appealing system of governance. Afghans already know what life under the Taliban is like. Provide incentives and support for Afghans to take back their country but allow them to do it and take the credit for it.
Assertion 6: “A Surge Will Mitigate Insurgents Crossing Into Afghanistan From Pakistan.” Perhaps in the short-term. But the only long-term solution for the problem of radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot be predicated on soldiers policing the vast border between the two countries. Pakistan must be enticed into dealing with the Pakistani Taliban through political, economic, and social tools. America cannot solve the problem of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan with more military force.
Conclusion: The surge is not a panacea and may even be counterproductive in its current form. Many Western foreign policy thinkers, politicians, and military planners romantically believe that more force can stabilize and fix the country. The incoming Obama foreign and defense policy team must look far beyond the surge for solutions to the problems in Afghanistan. [6]
I would like to emphasize that although the Obama strategy incorporates all (or most of) the elements that are mentioned above, including striving for a regional solution that would involve ALL of Afghanistans neighbors (such as Iran, China, Russia and all the “stans” of Central Asia), the current strategy still, stubbornly, includes this troop surge that only serves to exacerbate all the issues that we are trying to address with all the other objectives in the strategy!!! (E.g., how can we expect to “engag[e] the Afghan government and bolster its legitimacy” and “encourag[e] Afghan government efforts to integrate reconcilable insurgents” when the continuing, and possibly escalating, violence and civilian deaths are heightening the already considerable animosity of the majority Pashtun population towards the U.S. and contributes to perceptions in the Afghan street that Karzai and the current Afghan government are mere puppets of the hated occupiers (U.S./NATO) who are responsible for killing their family members (most of the Taliban are Pashtun)?!) [7]
The video below is just a recent example of what will likely be a result of a troop surge – escalating civilian deaths, hatred of the U.S./NATO, perception of us as foreign occupiers who are not concerned about Afghans, etc. …
I urge you to EMPOWER Obama to resist the powerful influences of pro-surge advocates in Congress, in the Pentagon, in the military-industrial lobby, etc., by adding your voice to the growing number of voices of reason which MUST rise above those voices coming from the pro-surge camp and sending a mandate to Obama from the American people demanding he change course and reverse the troop surge before it’s too late and the damage of our failed strategy in Afghanistan becomes irreversible.
I URGE you to do this by supporting Senator Russ Feingold’s bill (S. 3197) and Rep. Jim McGovern’s bill (H.R. 5015) (both contain the same language and were just introduced in their respective houses in Congress on April 14) by sending letters to your Congressional Representatives using the very quick and easy process on Just Foreign Policy’s web site here: http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/node/548
If you want to add something to your letter (the suggested letter on the JFP web site), may I suggest one or both of the following:
Our policies do not make us safer, but play into the "plan to bleed America to the point of bankruptcy" as described by Osama Bin Laden. [Bruce Lawrence, ed., “Messages to the World,” Verso, 2005, p. 243.]
The rapid escalations of night-raids by US Special Ops teams and the CIA's drone attacks which arouse massive hatred among the Muslim population. ["CIA Expanding Presence in Afghanistan," LA Times, Sept. 20, 2009; Jane Mayer, "The Predator War," The New Yorker]
(Note: both of the above statements are from: Tom Hayden, “A PEACE STRATEGY, 2010-2011,” U.S. Labor Against the War http://www.uslaboragainstwar.org/article.php?id=21583
Please also read two brief articles which state why it is CRITICAL and URGENT for Americans to immediately voice their support for this legislation and are written by the two people who I think express it best – Tom Hayden and Robert Naiman (Just Foreign Policy). They both make the extemely important point that efforts in Congress regarding setting a deadline for withdrawal of troops from Iraq was the impetus which lead to the current agreement with the Iraq government for the withdrawal of American forces there. Go to those articles here …
http://tomhayden.com/home/2010/4/8/a-withdrawal-plan-for-afghanistan.html
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/04/15-2
PLEASE also help by adding a short comment on this blog (include your name and city and say something like: “I sent letters to my reps on the JFP site”). This will enable me to report to Tom Hayden’s organization, other national orgs, and local groups in my area about the effectiveness of my efforts to recruit people to take action on this issue.
In conclusion, if you would be interested in a few examples of the perspective from sources in the region, please see:
Hany Ramadan (Staff Writer and editor in the Politics in Depth section of IslamOnline[dot]net. He is currently working on a master's degree in political studies at Cairo University's Faculty of Economics and Political Science), “Analyzing Obama's New Afghan Strategy: Is the Troop Surge the Right Solution?” December 2, 2009
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1258880684335&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout
Khalid Rahman (Director General of the Islamabad based think tank Institute of Policy Studies), “Pakistan: Instability and Regional Politics -- The Impact of the US and Regional Players,” December 10, 2009 http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1258880473369&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout
References:
1. CNN.com, “Obama Afghanistan strategy: More troops in quickly, drawdown in 2011,” December 1, 2009
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/01/obama.afghanistan/index.html
2. Leslie Gelb, “New Doubts About Afghanistan,” The Daily Beast, January 25, 2010
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-01-25/the-generals-new-afghan-message/
3. White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/afghanistan_pakistan_white_paper_final.pdf
4. Greg Bruno, “Afghanistan’s National Security Forces” (Introduction), Council on Foreign Relations, April 16, 2009
http://www.cfr.org/publication/19122/
5. Leslie Gelb, "Obama Got It Right—And Petraeus Agrees 100 Percent," The Daily Beast, December 2, 2009
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-12-02/the-lesser-evil/full/
6. Tyler Moselle (Research Associate, Harvard Kennedy School, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy), “Fallacies of a Surge in Afghanistan,” Peace Action Peace Blog, January 14, 2009
http://peaceblog.wordpress.com/tag/tyler-moselle/
7. Nearly all of the insurgents battling US and NATO troops in Afghanistan are not religiously motivated Taliban and Al Qaeda warriors, but a new generation of tribal fighters vying for control of territory, mineral wealth, and smuggling routes, according to summaries of new US intelligence reports. Some of the major insurgent groups, including one responsible for a spate of recent American casualties, actually opposed the Taliban’s harsh Islamic government in Afghanistan during the 1990s, according to the reports, described by US officials under the condition they not be identified. “Ninety percent is a tribal, localized insurgency,’’ said one US intelligence official in Washington who helped draft the assessments. “Ten percent are hardcore ideologues fighting for the Taliban.’’ US commanders and politicians often loosely refer to the enemy as the Taliban or Al Qaeda, giving rise to the image of holy warriors seeking to spread a fundamentalist form of Islam. But the mostly ethnic Pashtun fighters are often deeply connected by family and social ties to the valleys and mountains where they are fighting, and they see themselves as opposing the United States because it is an occupying power, the officials and analysts said. (Source: “Taliban not main Afghan enemy,” The Boston Globe [boston.com], October 9, 2009
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2009/10/09/most_insurgents_in_afghanistan_not_religiously_motivated_military_reports_say/
• Deny al Qaeda a safe haven;
• Reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow Afghanistan's government; and,
• Strengthen Afghanistan's security forces and government. [1]
These objectives would be achieved by sending an additional 30,000 American soldiers to Afghanistan. The response to this EXCALATION of the war was considerable “blowback” – most originating from within his own party and from his political base of support (those folks who voted him into office).
Then, in January, (coincidentally?) revelations began to emerge in the form of statements by U.S. military and Pentagon leaders and others which seemed to indicate a softening of this approach. General McChrystal (U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan) stated in an interview, “There’s been enough fighting. What I think we do is try to shape conditions which allow people to come to a truly equitable solution to how the Afghan people are governed.” And, when asked about Taliban leaders participating in a future government, he responded, “I think any Afghans can play a role if they focus on the future, and not the past.” [2]
Around that same time, Kai Eide, the outgoing U.N. special representative in Afghanistan, urged Afghan President Karzai to take steps that would open the way for face-to-face talks between Afghan officials and Taliban leaders, saying, “If you want relevant results, then you have to talk to the relevant person in authority. I think the time has come to do it.” [2]
Defense secretary Gates also seemed to be supporting a power-sharing arrangement when he described the Taliban as part of Afghanistan’s “political fabric.” And, most devastating of all, was what Gates heard from Pakistani leaders in his recent visit: they would not resume the military offensive against the Taliban in the border region with Afghanistan for at least six months, which for them means more than a year. Gates and the generals know better than anyone else that the U.S. and NATO’s chances of making real and sustainable military progress in Afghanistan depend very heavily on the Taliban’s ability to keep its safe havens across the border in Pakistan. [2]
On March 27, the White House presented a white paper describing in further detail its strategy for Afghanistan (accompanied by a speech – on video – by Obama in which he provides his points in defense of this strategy). This white paper contains the following and other objectives to be achieved with this plan:
• Executing and resourcing an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan;
• Resourcing and prioritizing civilian assistance in Afghanistan;
• Expanding the Afghan National Security Forces: Army and Police;
• Engaging the Afghan government and bolstering its legitimacy;
• Encouraging Afghan government efforts to integrate reconcilable insurgents;
• Bolstering Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation;
• Strengthening Pakistani government capacity;
• Engaging and focusing Islamabad [Pakistan] on the common threat;
• Assisting Pakistan's capability to fight extremists;
• Asking for assistance from allies for Afghanistan and Pakistan;
• (and five more objectives not listed here -- none of which, like the above, are small tasks). [3]
Please consider for a moment all the above, including the building of the Afghan security forces up to the planned total strength of 216,000 by the end of 2011, and the likelihood this can all be achieved by the target date of July, 2011, which will (according to the plan) create the conditions in which we will be able to begin withdrawing troops and – at the same time -- consider that we have already been there for eight years and we have not yet even been able to achieve just the MILITARY objective! Please also consider that Army Gen. David McKiernan acknowledged last year that the handover of security to indigenous forces was "years away." [4]
Now, please consider something that Leslie Gelb said back in December when Obama first announced the troop surge (Gelb is supporting Obama’s “middle course” strategy, which he describes as not agreeing to give General McChrystal all 45,000 troops he requested, nor deciding to begin immediate withdrawal of troops): “So, the job of political leaders and policy experts now is to figure out how to help the president make his middle course more workable and reduce the risks of failure.”
And then he said something very interesting: “By urging this, I’m reversing a promise I made years ago after the Vietnam War. I worked in the Senate and the Pentagon for the early years of the war. I supported the war. When it was done, when I looked back at it and wrote a book about it, I concluded that Presidents Kennedy and Johnson steered a middle way because they felt they couldn’t win and couldn’t get out. Thus, they went step by step, deeper and deeper, doing just enough not to lose, pursuing a horribly costly war without any real prospect of a good outcome, simply hoping for something to turn up. I vowed I wouldn’t be a party to that kind of thinking again. I promised myself that when faced with a situation drowning in contradictions and highly contestable American interests, I would argue either to win or to withdraw.” [5]
I thank Mr. Gelb for bringing a consideration of the lessons (we should have learned) from the Vietnam War into the discussion of Afghanistan.
I now ask you to also consider the opinions of several other experts who do not agree AT ALL with Obama’s strategy to escalate the war by committing even more soldiers (as well as $33 billion tax dollars annually) …
Please watch this video (6 min.) of House debate on the issue and consider the opinions of Rep. Dennis Kucinich and many others (from my good friends at JUST Foreign Policy [emphasis added] ) …
I urge you to also consider what Tyler Moselle (Harvard Kennedy School, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy) said a year ago about U.S. policy regarding Afghanistan: “General David Petraeus of CENTCOM, a handful of American foreign policy thinkers and politicians, and many NATO allies support a “surge” of military troops to stabilize Afghanistan and fight the neo-Taliban insurgency. They rightly argue that the U.S. and the West in general should help rebuild Afghanistan. They argue that increasing the number of troops similar to the surge in Iraq is the first step for providing relief. Yet, while a surge of military troops can provide short-term security, there are six fallacies commonly utilized to support the argument for a surge that should be evaluated more closely to ensure Afghanistan receives the attention it deserves.”
He lists those fallacies and his responses to them, as follows:
Assertion 1: “A Surge in Afghanistan Will Stabilize the Country.” Only partially. A large-scale surge of American troops will likely bolster the legitimacy of the insurgency based on their image as anti-occupation fighters. In fact, increasing troops may attract jihadis from the region just as the Soviet invasion did in the 1980s and provide incentives for foreign powers to funnel funding and weapons to the insurgents as a way to undermine the U.S. (just as Iran did in Iraq and just as the U.S. did during the Soviet invasion).
Assertion 2: “An Army and Marine Corps Style-Surge is the Only Solution for Afghanistan.” Wrong. While U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency doctrine has come a long way, any new military strategy in Afghanistan should be based on Special Forces, intelligence operatives, and potentially constabulary forces from NATO allies. The American footprint should be lighter, not heavier, in Afghanistan. Strategists and policy planners should evaluate the British role in Oman as a useful case study.
Assertion 3: “A Surge is Necessary to Provide Security for a Political Solution.” Poor assumption. The multitude of tribes, ethnic groups, and religious leaders in Afghanistan must be enticed or coaxed into a factionalized political federation to provide stability for the country. Insecurity due to Taliban attacks must be combated by the citizens of Afghanistan based on alliances between tribes. Moreover, Americans are delusional when it comes to nation building. It would take roughly 10 years of a heavy occupation force combined with economic and social development to even start to provide a foundation for transforming deeply rooted issues in Afghanistan. American domestic political sensibilities will not support such an intense and long-term effort nor will the deepening economic recession. American forces do not want to occupy Afghanistan like they did in Germany, Japan, and South Korea — the only largely successful nation building endeavors in modern U.S. history. American policy-makers must articulate more realistic expectations.
Assertion 4: “The Karzai Government Will Fall Apart Without a Surge.” False. Karzai already complained of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. airpower as a propaganda victory for insurgents. U.S. support for Karzai must remain behind the scenes so he can cultivate political will for a unified government. Karzai needs more support but less visible American presence.
Assertion 5: “The Taliban and Potentially Al Qaeda Will Re-Establish Themselves Without a Surge.” Partially true. But Afghan citizens must provide a response to the worldview of both the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is largely discredited as a political movement in many parts of Iraq because of its inability to provide a more appealing system of governance. Afghans already know what life under the Taliban is like. Provide incentives and support for Afghans to take back their country but allow them to do it and take the credit for it.
Assertion 6: “A Surge Will Mitigate Insurgents Crossing Into Afghanistan From Pakistan.” Perhaps in the short-term. But the only long-term solution for the problem of radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot be predicated on soldiers policing the vast border between the two countries. Pakistan must be enticed into dealing with the Pakistani Taliban through political, economic, and social tools. America cannot solve the problem of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan with more military force.
Conclusion: The surge is not a panacea and may even be counterproductive in its current form. Many Western foreign policy thinkers, politicians, and military planners romantically believe that more force can stabilize and fix the country. The incoming Obama foreign and defense policy team must look far beyond the surge for solutions to the problems in Afghanistan. [6]
I would like to emphasize that although the Obama strategy incorporates all (or most of) the elements that are mentioned above, including striving for a regional solution that would involve ALL of Afghanistans neighbors (such as Iran, China, Russia and all the “stans” of Central Asia), the current strategy still, stubbornly, includes this troop surge that only serves to exacerbate all the issues that we are trying to address with all the other objectives in the strategy!!! (E.g., how can we expect to “engag[e] the Afghan government and bolster its legitimacy” and “encourag[e] Afghan government efforts to integrate reconcilable insurgents” when the continuing, and possibly escalating, violence and civilian deaths are heightening the already considerable animosity of the majority Pashtun population towards the U.S. and contributes to perceptions in the Afghan street that Karzai and the current Afghan government are mere puppets of the hated occupiers (U.S./NATO) who are responsible for killing their family members (most of the Taliban are Pashtun)?!) [7]
The video below is just a recent example of what will likely be a result of a troop surge – escalating civilian deaths, hatred of the U.S./NATO, perception of us as foreign occupiers who are not concerned about Afghans, etc. …
I urge you to EMPOWER Obama to resist the powerful influences of pro-surge advocates in Congress, in the Pentagon, in the military-industrial lobby, etc., by adding your voice to the growing number of voices of reason which MUST rise above those voices coming from the pro-surge camp and sending a mandate to Obama from the American people demanding he change course and reverse the troop surge before it’s too late and the damage of our failed strategy in Afghanistan becomes irreversible.
I URGE you to do this by supporting Senator Russ Feingold’s bill (S. 3197) and Rep. Jim McGovern’s bill (H.R. 5015) (both contain the same language and were just introduced in their respective houses in Congress on April 14) by sending letters to your Congressional Representatives using the very quick and easy process on Just Foreign Policy’s web site here: http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/node/548
If you want to add something to your letter (the suggested letter on the JFP web site), may I suggest one or both of the following:
Our policies do not make us safer, but play into the "plan to bleed America to the point of bankruptcy" as described by Osama Bin Laden. [Bruce Lawrence, ed., “Messages to the World,” Verso, 2005, p. 243.]
The rapid escalations of night-raids by US Special Ops teams and the CIA's drone attacks which arouse massive hatred among the Muslim population. ["CIA Expanding Presence in Afghanistan," LA Times, Sept. 20, 2009; Jane Mayer, "The Predator War," The New Yorker]
(Note: both of the above statements are from: Tom Hayden, “A PEACE STRATEGY, 2010-2011,” U.S. Labor Against the War http://www.uslaboragainstwar.org/article.php?id=21583
Please also read two brief articles which state why it is CRITICAL and URGENT for Americans to immediately voice their support for this legislation and are written by the two people who I think express it best – Tom Hayden and Robert Naiman (Just Foreign Policy). They both make the extemely important point that efforts in Congress regarding setting a deadline for withdrawal of troops from Iraq was the impetus which lead to the current agreement with the Iraq government for the withdrawal of American forces there. Go to those articles here …
http://tomhayden.com/home/2010/4/8/a-withdrawal-plan-for-afghanistan.html
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/04/15-2
PLEASE also help by adding a short comment on this blog (include your name and city and say something like: “I sent letters to my reps on the JFP site”). This will enable me to report to Tom Hayden’s organization, other national orgs, and local groups in my area about the effectiveness of my efforts to recruit people to take action on this issue.
In conclusion, if you would be interested in a few examples of the perspective from sources in the region, please see:
Hany Ramadan (Staff Writer and editor in the Politics in Depth section of IslamOnline[dot]net. He is currently working on a master's degree in political studies at Cairo University's Faculty of Economics and Political Science), “Analyzing Obama's New Afghan Strategy: Is the Troop Surge the Right Solution?” December 2, 2009
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1258880684335&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout
Khalid Rahman (Director General of the Islamabad based think tank Institute of Policy Studies), “Pakistan: Instability and Regional Politics -- The Impact of the US and Regional Players,” December 10, 2009 http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1258880473369&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout
References:
1. CNN.com, “Obama Afghanistan strategy: More troops in quickly, drawdown in 2011,” December 1, 2009
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/01/obama.afghanistan/index.html
2. Leslie Gelb, “New Doubts About Afghanistan,” The Daily Beast, January 25, 2010
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-01-25/the-generals-new-afghan-message/
3. White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/afghanistan_pakistan_white_paper_final.pdf
4. Greg Bruno, “Afghanistan’s National Security Forces” (Introduction), Council on Foreign Relations, April 16, 2009
http://www.cfr.org/publication/19122/
5. Leslie Gelb, "Obama Got It Right—And Petraeus Agrees 100 Percent," The Daily Beast, December 2, 2009
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-12-02/the-lesser-evil/full/
6. Tyler Moselle (Research Associate, Harvard Kennedy School, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy), “Fallacies of a Surge in Afghanistan,” Peace Action Peace Blog, January 14, 2009
http://peaceblog.wordpress.com/tag/tyler-moselle/
7. Nearly all of the insurgents battling US and NATO troops in Afghanistan are not religiously motivated Taliban and Al Qaeda warriors, but a new generation of tribal fighters vying for control of territory, mineral wealth, and smuggling routes, according to summaries of new US intelligence reports. Some of the major insurgent groups, including one responsible for a spate of recent American casualties, actually opposed the Taliban’s harsh Islamic government in Afghanistan during the 1990s, according to the reports, described by US officials under the condition they not be identified. “Ninety percent is a tribal, localized insurgency,’’ said one US intelligence official in Washington who helped draft the assessments. “Ten percent are hardcore ideologues fighting for the Taliban.’’ US commanders and politicians often loosely refer to the enemy as the Taliban or Al Qaeda, giving rise to the image of holy warriors seeking to spread a fundamentalist form of Islam. But the mostly ethnic Pashtun fighters are often deeply connected by family and social ties to the valleys and mountains where they are fighting, and they see themselves as opposing the United States because it is an occupying power, the officials and analysts said. (Source: “Taliban not main Afghan enemy,” The Boston Globe [boston.com], October 9, 2009
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2009/10/09/most_insurgents_in_afghanistan_not_religiously_motivated_military_reports_say/
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